The Rejection of Radical Foundationalism and Skepticism

Pragmatic Belief in God in Eliezer Berkovits’s Thought

Abstract

Faith has many aspects. One of them is whether absolute logical proof of God s existence is a strict prerequisite for the proper establishment of a religious system and for individual acceptance of that system. The treatment of this question, examined here in the Jewish context of the thought of Rabbi Prof. Eliezer Berkovits, has been strongly influenced in the modern era by the radical foundationalism and radical skepticism of Descartes, who rooted in the Western mind the notion that religion and religious issues “all or nothing” questions. Cartesianism, which surprisingly became the basis of modern secularism, was criticized by the classical American pragmatists. Peirce, James and Dewey all rejected the attempt to achieve absolute, infallible knowledge, as well as the presumptuousness of establishing such knowledge by means of casting Cartesian hyperbolic doubt. They advocated an alternative approach which was more holistic and humane. This paper lays out Descartes’s approach and the pragmatists’ critique. Despite the place that pragmatic considerations hold in |ewish tradition, some thinkers reject the relevance ofthese ideas. Yet Berkovits’s thought suggest a different path. He rejected Descartes’ radical skepticism and his radical foundationalism in favor ofa moderate foundationalism, which allows for a belief in God alongside constructive doubts. Similar to Peirce’s conception of the fixation of belief, Berkovits views local doubts (distinct from hyperbolic doubt) as necessary for thought. Berkovits’s understanding ofthe biblical human divine encounter ־ following Rosenzweig, Buber, and Heschel - is conceptualized here as “encounter theology.” Berkovits criticizes the propositionalist attempts to prove God’s existence logically, as well as the presumptousness ofbasing religious belief on the teleological world-order. However, Berkovits’s conception of the “caring God” is not logically provable and thus is defined here as a pragmatic “postulate.” The article concludes by considering Berkovits’s “encounter theology.” In contrast to Haym Soloveitchik, who has pointed out the connection between halakhic stringency and a lack of subjective experience of God’s face, Berkovits’s approach is dialogic through and through.